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Abstract
Formal veriﬁcation of embedded software systems often requires a low-level representation of the program
under scrutiny. It is often the case that the veriﬁcation tools rely on ad-hoc encodings of particular assembly
language semantics. In this paper we use the K framework to formally deﬁne a MIPS-based assembly
language. Our proposed deﬁnition is modular in the sense that it accommodates various organizations for
the storage-related aspects of the semantics. We also present how to instantiate our K language deﬁnition
on two main memory models, corresponding to diﬀerent representations of the assembly code. Such a formal
language deﬁnition could be directly used by the program veriﬁcation tools.
Keywords: formal executable semantics, assembly language, the K framework
1 Introduction
Reasoning about behavior of embedded systems often requires knowledge about a
program execution on a particular architecture. Thus, it is important to bridge
the gap between these two components and to consider a convenient, low-level
representation of the program. The assembly level is such a representation as it oﬀers
information about registers, instruction memory addresses, code interaction with the
memory system (via load/store instructions), information about data placement etc.
Prominent areas of research on formal methods applied at the assembly-level
code include: software security with detection and analyses of malicious behavior,
compiler design with correct-by-construction code generation and embedded systems
with non-functional requirements guarantees of the executables. The latter category
includes the problem of formally deriving execution timing bounds for a program,
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with respect to the underlying architecture. It is required that the assembly code
representation presents certain guarantees (i.e. absence of run-time errors). It is
common to employ static analysis techniques on the high-level code and to assume
that the compilation preserves the original properties of it. An alternative is to apply
the analyses directly on the assembly code. We adhere to the latter alternative,
from the following perspective: deﬁne the language semantics and use it to develop
analysis tools.
In this paper, we use K, a rewrite-based framework for programming languages
design and analysis, to give a formal executable semantics of a RISC assembly
language. We opt for the Simplescalar toolset PISA assembly language, in [2],
which is based on the MIPS IV language. This toolset comes with a modiﬁed gcc
compiler to generate such assembly code and eases the experimentation with various
architecture features (i.e. caches, prediction mechanisms etc). While the latter point
is beyond the scope of this work, the former helps in testing the semantics, via
automated assembly code generation.
A ﬁrst desiderate of our formal executable semantics of the RISC assembly
language is the following - one rewrite rule for each language instruction. In this
way we achieve a two-layered organization of the deﬁnition: the ﬁrst layer contains
the transformation of each instruction semantics into support operations and the
second layer contains the implementations of these operations. For example, an
ALU instruction is transformed into error checks, if necessary, followed by the
corresponding source registers look-ups and the destination register update.
A second desiderate of our K executable semantics is to accommodate a uniform
deﬁnition of semantic rules applicable to diﬀerent representations of an assembly
program. According to this, the most important design decision is to split the
language conﬁguration into the semantic entities corresponding to the memory
conﬁguration and the register ﬁle, the former getting two instances and the latter
remaining unmodiﬁed. This requires a communication interface to facilitate the
interaction between these two. Another important design decision is to deﬁne a
specialized module for the support operations of the semantics, signed and unsigned
integers as well as single and double precision ﬂoating point.
We distinguish between the following two representations of an assembly language
program: (1) the assembly code obtained directly from a high-level program, say a
C program and (2) a representation of the disassembled executable. Fig. 1 displays
a simple C function that computes the sum of elements in an array in the left, the
encoding of (1) in the middle and (2) in the right.
There are several distinctive features between these two variants. The direct
encoding of the assembly program, in Fig. 1 (middle), uses labels as an abstract
representation of the memory addresses for both instructions (i.e. L1, L2) and data
(i.e. the array a). This makes it suitable for constructing the initial conﬁguration of
the program, as for example, the array a is initialized in the .rdata section. The
representation of a disassembled executable provides exact information about the
code memory layout (i.e. the concrete addresses 1000, 1004 etc), but makes it diﬃcult
to construct the initial program state. Our implementation is capable to handle both
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formats, provided that certain requirements are satisﬁed. We elaborate on these in
the implementation section.
Related Work. Developing formal methods for assembly code is important for
a wide range of applications. In computer security, there are techniques for detection
of malicious code behavior [5] and protection against virus infection using code
obfuscation [17]. In compiler design, the current approaches follow the principles
stated in [14], either to generate correct-by-construction assembly code [16] or
assembly code extensions, such as a type system [22], to facilitate its validation.
Another important application is the worst-case execution time (WCET) analysis
of embedded code, when it is necessary to guarantee execution time bounds for a
particular program. For a survey on timing analyses, we refer the reader to [28].
All the previously mentioned applications require, usually ad-hoc, implementations
of assembly language semantics. Our approach is to provide a formal executable
semantics, which should serve as a basis for developing analysis methods. We use
the K framework, a specialization of rewriting logic [21,18].
In the same class of formal executable semantics of assembly languages there are
the theorem-proving based approaches. One of the ﬁrst works uses the ACL2 [15]
prover to certify microcode programs for the Motorola CAP DSP [3]. The processor
is modeled at both the instruction set and the pipeline levels. Another similar
formalization is of ARM6 in [9] and ARM7 in [10], both using HOL theorem prover
[11]. All these assembly language encodings are in the context of formal veriﬁcation
of the underlying architecture, and embeds correctness criteria with respect to the
properties of interest. Our proposed K language deﬁnition focuses on a diﬀerent
aspect, it is designed to be more modular to accommodate various formats of the
input program, without changing the semantics.
The Maude system [6,7] is the implementation of rewriting logic and together
with a number of integrated methodologies and tools, it facilitates the design and
analysis of systems. To the best of our knowledge, there are two approaches to model
assembly languages. The work in [12] proposes a ﬁrst model of a simpliﬁed RISC
assembly language, used in veriﬁcation of various microprocessor elements. The
method presented in [27] presents a limited subset of the x86 assembly language for
malware behavior detection. Both of these approaches focus more on veriﬁcation
issues and less on the language deﬁnition ones. Language semantics deﬁnitions rely
on the memory system speciﬁcation, both at the structural and functional levels.
With respect to the memory representation in formal language deﬁnitions using
rewriting logic, our current work complements the work in [13], which proposes
memory models for imperative and object-oriented languages.
The K framework, described in [26], is a rewrite based framework that enables
the deﬁnitions of operational semantics of programming languages. K shows its
versatily when handling deﬁnitions of real languages, such as C in [8], Scheme in [19]
and Verilog in [20]. In our previous work [1], we succinctly introduced the integer
subset of the language of interest. The current implementation of K is implemented
on top of the Maude system and is called K-Maude. In this way, it has access to all
integrated technologies and tools that Maude oﬀers.
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Outline of the paper. The paper is organized in the following way. Section
2 brieﬂy overviews some concepts of the K framework as we formally deﬁne the
assembly language. Section 3 describes a modular system with an emphasis on
the main memory modeling and two of its possible instances. Section 4 presents
implementation and benchmarking speciﬁc details, while Section 5 contains the
conclusions.
2 Assembly Language in K
The K framework facilitates deﬁnitions of modular and executable programming
language semantics, using a specialized, concise notation to represent and manipulate
language conﬁgurations. A language deﬁnition has three components: the language
syntax, the conﬁguration and the language semantics. The (abstract) syntax in K
uses the BNF form and could include annotations with respect to the evaluation
order. A language conﬁguration represents the set of necessary semantic entities
to capture the programming language semantics. In K a language conﬁguration is
represented as a multiset of cells. A cell, written as 〈cont〉lbl is identiﬁed by the cell
content cont (also a multiset of cells) and the cell name (or label), lbl.
The rules in K are of two kinds: computational rules, which are transitions in a
program execution, and structural rules, that make a term amenable to the applica-
tion of a computational rule. The K framework distinguishes between structural and
computational rules as a mechanism to control the abstraction degree of a deﬁnition.
This split follows the rewriting logic approach, where a rewrite logic theory is repre-
sented as a transition system with the states represented by equations (i.e. structural
rule in K) and the transitions represented by rewrite rules (i.e. computational rule in
K). In the K framework, a rule is by default computational. K uses a generalization
of the usual rewrite rule, in the sense that a rewrite rule could also manipulate
parts of a rewrite term (as read, write or don’t care). The compact, bi-directional,
notation represents the lefthand side of a rule placed above a horizontal line and the
righthand side placed below. For a more elaborate presentation on the framework
and its current implementation, we refer the reader to [26] and respectively [25].
We give more practical insights into K when we deﬁne the Simplescalar [4] PISA
assembly language, which we call SSRISC. Next, we present a subset of it that
includes integer and ﬂoating point ALU-instructions, branch and jump instructions,
load and store instructions, an instruction for program errors. In other words, the
subset exposes many of the language semantic entities, using the K specialized
notation.
Apart from the instruction set presented in [4], there is a set of instructions
that appear in the direct encoding of the assembly language (i.e. instructions
la or move) or a number of pseudo-instructions that appears in the executables.
Both kind of instructions have been deﬁned as well. For presentation purposes, we
include only the instruction la and omit to describe all the pseudo-instructions. The
general methodology for language deﬁnitions in K is standard: ﬁrst, we deﬁne the
(abstract) syntax, then we present the language semantics, using transformations on
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main (void) { .rdata
int a[3]={-2,1,4}; a: .word -2
int i, sum=0; . . . . . .
for (i=0; i<3; i++) .text
sum=sum+a[i]; la $3,a 1000 lui $3,4096
lw $4,0($3) 1004 lw $4,0($3)
return sum; . . .
} L1: lw $2,32($fp) 1028 lw $2,32($30)
slt $3,$2($3),3 1032 slti $3,$2,3
bne $3,$0,L2 1036 bne $3,$0,1044
j L3 1040 j 1060
L2: . . . 1044 . . .
L3: . . . 1060 . . .
Fig. 1. C program (left) with snapshots of direct assembly code (middle) and disassembled code (right)
the structural elements that make the conﬁguration.
The SSRISC deﬁnition is designed to be concise and modular. From an orga-
nizational point of view, the formal executable semantics presents two layers: an
structural layer in which each instruction is transformed into simpler operations and a
computational layer containing the implementation of these particular support opera-
tions (i.e. register look-up, register update, program counter implementation). With
the structural layer, our deﬁnition has one K rewrite rule per language instruction,
making it amenable for extensions.
2.1 Syntax
The annotated K syntax for the subset of SSRISC assembly language is in Fig. 2. In
the square brackets there is a special K notation, called strictness attribute. The
keyword strict means that the particular operand on which strictness apply is
reduced to a base value, called KResult. For example, the add instruction is strict
on the second and third operands, which implies that the last two registers, called
sources, are reduced to values before the actual addition takes place and the ﬁrst
operand, the destination register, gets updated with this value. When the strictness
attribute appears without arguments, i.e. the div instruction, it means that all the
operands reduce to KResult values, before further computation takes place.
2.2 Conﬁguration
The conﬁguration the SSRISC assembly language consists of a set of general integer
and ﬂoating point registers, a number of special registers, a memory representation -
usually as code and various data segments etc. Leaving aside the semantic entities
for the memory modeling for reasons that we explain later, the SSRISC language
conﬁguration is the following:
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syntax Instr ::= add Reg , Reg , Reg ; [strict(2 3)]
| div Reg , Reg ; [strict(1 2)]
| j Addr ; [strict]
| jal Addr ; [strict]
| beq Reg , Reg , Addr ; [strict(1 2)]
| lw Reg , Oﬀ ( Reg ); [strict(3)]
| sw Reg , Oﬀ ( Reg ); [strict(3)]
| break;
| bc1t Oﬀ ;
| l.s FReg , Oﬀ ( Reg ); [strict(3)]
| s.s FReg , Oﬀ ( Reg ); [strict(3)]
| add.s FReg , FReg , FReg ; [strict(2 3)]
| div.s FReg , FReg , FReg ; [strict(2 3)]
Fig. 2. SSRISC abstract syntax: Reg and FReg means integer and respectively ﬂoating point registers,
Addr, Oﬀ are of sort #Int32
configuration:
〈
·
〉
k
〈
0
〉
pc
〈
0
〉
hi
〈
0
〉
lo
〈
0
〉
ra
〈
0
〉
break
〈
·
〉
regs
〈
0
〉
fcc
〈
·
〉
fregs
K uses two special cells: T (not represented) encloses all the other cells and k
maintains computational contents, such as programs or program fragments. pc is a
special register, called program counter and its value indicates the current executing
instruction. We opt to represent the program counter in a diﬀerent cell than the other
registers, as it improves the readability of the semantics, especially on conditional
and unconditional jumps. lo and hi are special registers, required by the integer
multiplication and division instructions to hold parts of the computed results. The ra
cell represents a special register which stores the return address of a function call. The
fcc is a special ﬂag used in comparison operations between ﬂoating point registers.
The regs and fregs cells consists of the set of the integer registers, respectively the
ﬂoating point registers, as mappings from integer, respectively ﬂoating point, register
names to stored values. The break cell is used only by the instruction break and
captures program errors such as overﬂow or division by zero.
2.3 Semantics
The execution of each SSRISC instruction is split in a number of successive steps.
It starts with the requests for the instruction and the operands from the memory,
then continues with the actual processing and terminates with the state update.
In this paper we adopt a sequential model of execution for the SSRISC programs,
the integration of the pipeline-based computation model, supported by the MIPS
languages is the subject of subsequent investigation.
The computational layer of the semantics contains some common functionality
(or support operations), as general register lookup and update, or use some wrappers
as for the pc register update. Before we describe the instruction semantics, we cover
these general rules. For example, to execute the instruction at the current program
point, denoted by the value of PC in the pc cell, the rule below the computation
evolves to geti(PC) which is an instruction request from the memory.
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rule 〈 ·
geti( PC )
〉k 〈PC 〉pc
The rule reads like this: the underlined k cell emphasizes a "write" part of the
term and information below the line, geti(PC) replaces the empty computation,
represented with a dot. The pc cell represents a "read" part of the term, it is not
underlined, and provides the value PC that is used by geti.
The lookup and update operations on the registers require two cells, k and regs
for integer registers or k and fregs for the ﬂoating point registers. We have included
only the rule for the integer registers case. If the current computational task is an
integer register lookup, for a register R, as shown below the resulting conﬁguration
has the corresponding value I for R from the integer register ﬁle.
rule 〈 R
I
···〉k 〈··· R → I ···〉regs
This rule brings a new element of the K notation, the "don’t care" part of a
term, represented with the dots. If this follows a subterm, such as register R in k
cell, it means that R is the ﬁrst computational task, followed by potentially other
computational tasks, which are not important for this rule. Similarly, if the top
computational task is to update a register, say Rd with a computed value I, the
previous value of Rd, denoted by the wildcard _, is replaced by I, as shown below.
The regs cell has dots at both ends and represents that the element R → I is not
necessarily the ﬁrst nor the last in the cell.
rule 〈updateReg( I1 , Rd )
·
〉k 〈··· Rd → _
I1
···〉regs
The pc register update consists of three cases: the rule shown below with the
automated incrementation before an instruction fetch, the case of a mandatory jump
which results into the pc cell information update and ﬁnally, the fall-through case
which leaves the value of pc unmodiﬁed.
rule 〈incPC( PC )
·
···〉k 〈 PC
PC +Int32 4
〉pc
We present a number of SSRISC instructions, which cover arithmetic-logic in-
structions on both integer and ﬂoating point registers, branch and jump instructions,
load and store instructions, an instruction to manipulate special ﬂags (i.e. bc1t) as
well as a special instruction for program errors - break. We implement the semantics
in [4].
The K semantic rules having an instruction on top of the k cell transform it into
either a register update or an error check followed by another register operation etc.
All these rules are labeled as structural and form one layer of the semantics.
Out of the arithmetic-logic instructions, we present the two addition instructions:
add on integer operands and add.s on ﬂoating point operands. The K rule for add
states that the instruction with the source integer registers having values V1 and V2
reduces to an overﬂow check, ovf, for the signed addition between these two values
and, if necessary, followed by the destination register Rd update with the result.
When the overﬂow condition is on top of the computation and it is evaluated to true,
the execution continues with an instruction for program errors, break. The K rule for
addition instruction add.s is reduced to a term for the register update, updateFReg,
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having the single precision sum of the two ﬂoating point values F1 and F2. The
semantic deﬁnitions of these two instructions rely on support operations: +Int32,
==Int32 for the sum and comparison between 32-bit signed integers, +SgFloat for
the sum of single precision ﬂoating point values.
rule 〈 add Rd , V1 , V2 ;
ovf( V1 , V2 )  updateReg( V1 +Int32 V2 , Rd )
〉k [structural]
rule 〈ovf( V1 , V2 )
break;
···〉k when ovfs32 ( V1 , V2 ) ==Int32 1
rule 〈 add.s Fd , F1 , F2 ;
updateFReg( F1 +SgFloat F2 , Fd )
〉k [structural]
The two division instructions, div and div.s are transformed into a division by
zero check for the denominator value followed by the register updates, the special
registers lo and hi, respectively a general purpose ﬂoating point register Fd.
The branch and jump instructions transform the task in the k cell into a correct
pc register update. Before each instruction is reduced, via a structural K rule, into
the corresponding operation, the value of the pc register has the address of the next
instruction. The two rules for instructions j and jal use the setPC operation with
the ﬁrst argument 1 which means a program counter update. The jump and link
jal instruction saves, in the ra cell, the return address after the execution of the
callee function terminates. The instruction bc1t sets the target address depending
on the value of a special ﬂag called fcc.
rule 〈 j Addr ;
setPC( 1 , Addr )
〉k [structural]
rule 〈 jal Imm ;
setPC( 1 , Imm )
〉k 〈PC 〉pc 〈 _
PC +Int32 8
〉ra [structural]
rule 〈 bc1t Oﬀ ;
setPC( Bool2Int( FC ==Bool 1 ) , Oﬀ )
〉k 〈FC 〉fcc [structural]
For the branch when equal beq, the address of the next instruction depends on
the comparison between two values, V1 and V2, fall-through for 0 or branch taken for
1. Bool2Int is a built-in operation to ensure correct sort coercion.
The SSRISC assembly language has two families of load/store instructions: lw
and sw use integer registers as data source, respectively data destination and l.s
and s.s manipulate, in the same way, ﬂoating point registers. Both load instructions
are reduced to memory read requests via getd operation, which takes two arguments,
the memory address and the destination register (Rd or Ft). Similarly, the store
instructions are reduced to memory write requests via putd operation, which has the
memory address and the source register as arguments. The main memory, presented
in the next section, processes the getd and putd requests.
rule 〈 l.s Ft , Oﬀ ( V1 );
updateFReg( getd( V1 +Int32 Oﬀ ) , Ft )
〉k [structural]
rule 〈 s.s Ft , Oﬀ ( V1 );
putd( V1 +Int32 Oﬀ , Ft )
〉k [structural]
The last semantic rule of the SSRISC language treats the special break instruction.
The k cell gets the last term that ends the computation, while the special break cell
updates to reﬂect a program error. We mention that last is also used for normal
termination of computation.
M. Asa˘voae / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 304 (2014) 111–125118
rule 〈break;
last
···〉k 〈 _
1
〉break [structural]
The SSRISC language has also a number of pseudo-instructions, each being a
syntactic sugar for a sequence of instructions. In the next section we introduce and
discuss, in the context of main memory modeling, one important pseudo-instruction
called la - load address.
3 The K Memory Modeling
Our design relies on a number of modules which communicate using predeﬁned
message names. We recall that the concrete conﬁguration, described in Section
2.3, omits a store or memory cell which is actually necessary to capture program
executions. We decide to design the language semantics rules to update only the
registers and, in this way, to decouple the representation of the main memory. This
makes possible to represent, in an independent way, both the labeled representation
of data and instruction addresses as well as the memory layout of the disassembled
code and data. We start with the former.
3.1 Memory Model
We emulate the organization of an assembly ﬁle into a code and data text, with
the K conﬁguration for the main memory having, along with the k cell, the two
corresponding cells, cmem and respectively dmem.
configuration:〈
·
〉
k
〈
·
〉
cmem
〈
·
〉
dmem
The k cell processes the requests for instruction or data that come from the
cache memories or the processor. In our design, the language semantics issues an
instruction request, using the geti(PC ) operation. The memory system interprets
the PC value as an address and checks this location in the code memory part, cmem
cell. There are two possible cases, each modeled with a K rule. If the instruction is
found in the code memory cmem, and geti(PC ) rewrites to the actual instruction,
while the control is back to the processor. If the instruction is not found in the code
memory cmem, a special token denoted as last, signals the execution termination.
We rely on a special built-in function notIn to check if the instruction exists in the
code memory.
rule 〈 geti( PC )
incPC( PC )  Ins
···〉k 〈··· PC → Ins ···〉cmem
rule 〈geti( PC )
last
〉k 〈CMem〉cmem when notIn ( CMem , PC )
We handle memory data requests using the memory address Addr wrapped using
a special communication message getd. There are two cases. The ﬁrst and obvious
one is when the data memory, in the cell dmem has the necessary data, Data. The
second case assumes that, the data was not previously initialized or written, a new
memory address Addr is added in the dmem cell and the value is 0.
rule 〈getd( Addr )
Data
···〉k 〈··· Addr → Data ···〉dmem
M. Asa˘voae / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 304 (2014) 111–125 119
syntax Instr ::= la Reg , SVar ;
| lw Reg , SVar + Oﬀ ;
Fig. 3. Extension of SSRISC abstract syntax: the sort SVar represents for symbolic data address
rule 〈getd( Addr )
0
···〉k 〈DMem ·
Addr → 0
〉dmem when notIn ( DMem , Addr )
An alternative is to initialize such a data with an unknown, symbolic value, which
can be accommodated with changes at the built-in level. We refer to this issue in
the implementation section.
3.2 An Extended Memory Model
We introduce next the labeled representation of a memory addresses and how the K
framework caters for easy semantic extensions, both at the level of conﬁguration and
rules. In Fig. 1 (middle) there is an assembly language snippet that uses labels for
instruction addresses (i.e. L1, L2) and for data addresses, (i.e. a).
For presentation purposes, we describe how to incrementally extend the SSRISC
assembly language deﬁnition to accommodate labels for data addresses, assuming
that all the instruction addresses are a priori assigned to actual memory addresses.
Therefore, the two previous rules with the geti operation in the top of the k cell
remain unmodiﬁed. The data request rules get extended with a special case. We
describe next how our design can accommodate changes, from syntax augmentation,
in Fig. 3, to modiﬁcations in the language semantics and in the memory model.
First, the new instruction la that loads a destination integer register with the
data that resides at a symbolic address. The sort of this address is denoted by SVar
and is subsorted to the built-in sort for identiﬁers #Id. Then, the load instruction
lw could handle symbolic addresses, based on a speciﬁed oﬀset.
The execution of an instruction that manipulates symbolic data addresses (i.e.
la or lw) is transformed into an integer register Rd update, via a structural K rule.
The symbolic memory address VA is wrapped by a new term, getAddr, which acts
as communication message between the semantic and the memory model.
rule 〈 la Rd , VA ;
updateReg( getAddr( VA ) , Rd )
〉k [structural]
rule 〈 lw Rd , VA + Oﬀ ;
updateReg( getAddr( VA + Oﬀ ) , Rd )
〉k [structural]
We extend the memory model with a new cell, called dlabels which holds a
mapping between symbolic addresses and concrete values. These values are arbitrarily
generated and used in the dmem cell.
configuration:
〈
·
〉
k
〈
·
〉
cmem
〈
·
〉
dmem
〈
·
〉
dlabels
There are several other possible extensions. For example, the labels for instruction
addresses can be handled in a similar way, using a specialized cell. The message
getAddr is transformed into a lookup in the list of labels, to identify the value Val
associated with a particular label VA. When this particular message is the result of
the execution of a lw instruction, the actual data address is translated, using the
information stored in the cell dlabels.
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rule 〈getAddr( VA )
Val
···〉k 〈··· VA → Val ···〉dlabels
rule 〈getAddr( VA + V1 )
Val
···〉k 〈··· VA → V2 ···〉dlabels 〈··· V1 +Int32 V2 → Val ···〉dmem
The set of instructions that appear in the labeled representation of the assembly
code include, among others, the lw and sw instructions which manipulate the actual
data addresses. Therefore, the extended memory module includes the K rules for the
aforementioned communication messages geti and getd.
4 Implementation
The current implementation of the SSRISC assembly language follows a standard
approach for programming language deﬁnitions in the K framework. In general, such
a deﬁnition in K comprises of a syntax module, a semantic module and the use of a
built-in module for the implementation of the support operations. Our deﬁnition of
the SSRISC assembly language poses two kinds of particularities, imposed on one
hand by the language speciﬁcs and on another hand by the target applications. We
start with the former and elaborate on the later afterwards.
Our system design consists of several important modules, shown in Fig. 4. There
are: a built-in module builtins and its extension to symbolic values and operations
s-builtins, a "glue" module, ssrisc-settings to specify how the language semantics,
represented by ssrisc-lang communicates with the main memory, represented by
ssrisc-mem.
builtins(#Int32, #Floats) s-builtins
ssrisc-settings
 
ssrisc-lang
Syntax
+
Semantics
ssrisc-mem
mem
ext-mem
geti getd
geti getAddr
Fig. 4. The system organization: ssrisc-settings keeps the communication channels between the language
deﬁnition ssrisc-lang and various main memory models mem and ext-mem
The language speciﬁcs inﬂuence the language design in the following way: the
semantic rules of the assembly language instructions use various representations
for integers (signed and unsigned, on 32-bit, 16-bit or 8-bit format) and ﬂoating
point numbers (single and double precisions). All these, together with constant
declarations, arithmetic and logic operations, conversion operations between these
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data types and auxiliary checks (i.e. overﬂow/underﬂow, comparison with zero) are
in a special built-in module, developed on top of the standard programming language
built-in provided by K. For example, the signed addition between two integers,
+Int32 is implemented over the +Int operation. The current implementation uses
the predeﬁned Maude number representations for both integers and ﬂoating points.
Apart from the implementation of a speciﬁc built-in module, we decide to separate
the memory component from the other semantic pieces that deﬁne the SSRISC
language state. We opt for this modular implementation to accommodate further
reﬁnements of the memory, with minimal modiﬁcation of the language semantics.
In the previous section we presented such a reﬁnement, that allows the represen-
tation of the data memory addresses with labels. We use this to construct the initial
state of a program and to facilitate testing the SSRISC semantics. The alternative
memory deﬁnition, which we obtain from disassembling the executables, does not
help with this aspect. For the example program in Fig. 1 (middle), dlabels contains
the information a → 100, and dmem contains {100 → −2, 104 → 1, 108 → 4}, in
other words, the values of the array a - same ﬁgure (left). The symbolic address is
transformed into concrete value, for example 100.
An important element in our design is what we name a communication module,
to allow easy extensions to the deﬁnition. For example, the K rules for the load and
store instructions use geti and getd operations to fetch instructions, respectively
data, from the memory. We call these communication channels between the semantics
and the memory module, and we place them into the communication module. In this
way, the memory model could be replaced with a diﬀerent one, without modifying
the semantics. Another example is with respect to the labeled representation of the
data memory addresses. The instruction la uses a communication channel called
getAddr to access the information in the cell dlabels.
A particularity of the SSRISC deﬁnition is that it allows to underspecify the
memory content using symbolic values for stored data. For example, if a load
instruction (i.e. lw, l.s and la accesses a memory address with an unknown value,
this value is retrieved and further propagated during the program execution. The
set of speciﬁc built-in operations on bitwise representation is extended to handle the
symbolic value. We have used this feature in the context of abstract execution of
programs for estimation of timing bounds [1].
The Simplescalar toolset [4] is an architecture simulator and presents two sets
of instructions: a MIPS-based assembly language, used to compile C programs into
it and a set of simulator-speciﬁc instructions. We implement the former, together
with a number of pseudo-instructions and some of the instructions speciﬁc to the
program with labels. There are 112 instructions, each implemented using exactly
one K rewrite rule, and 20 rewrite rules for auxiliary operations (i.e. set the program
counter, overﬂow check etc). The memory modelings comprises of 15-20 rewrite rules,
which are split into memory read and write cases (for word and double word).
Besides of the possibility to manually construct the initial state (i.e. registers
and data memory contents) of the program, we allow a limited amount of automated
testing, subjective to certain assumptions. For example, we need to produce assembly
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code without library function calls (i.e. memcpy), which currently, we do not support.
We consider simple C programs, with small arrays of integer and ﬂoating point values,
to test various arithmetic and logic instructions, as well as load/store instructions
and conditional and unconditional jumps. Also, the return value of a C program and
its corresponding representation in the assembly program - the value in a particular
register - should be compared and decide if the test program passes or fails. We
reiterate that our intention is to present the SSRISC language deﬁnition as a basis
to deﬁne abstractions for timing analysis of embedded programs. For this purpose,
the input program uses the non-labeled representation of the main memory because
it contains useful information about actual instruction and data placement.
5 Conclusions
Program reasoning at the assembly language level is particularly important in the
security and embedded systems research areas. We approach this problem from a
novel perspective, advocated by the K framework, to deﬁne programming languages
and to use this deﬁnition for development of program analysis and veriﬁcation
tools. In this paper, we proposed a formal executable semantics of a RISC assembly
language, called SSRISC and based on MIPS IV. We relied on the modularity of
K to give two memory models, one using labels for data addresses and another
for the addresses in the disassembled code. Also, the semantic deﬁnition required
a speciﬁc built-in module for operations on the signed and unsigned integers and
ﬂoating point numbers on single and double precisions. Everything was integrated
and experimented with, in the K-Maude tool.
In the strict sense of the deﬁnition of SSRISC, this current work should be
extended in two directions. First, the implementation of the built-in module uses
Maude’s representation of integer and ﬂoating point numbers and therefore, it requires
concrete implementations of some of the operations. There are two possible solutions
to this: a native Maude implementation or using a third party program using the IO
capabilities of K or Maude. Second, the main memory modeling is more complex
than what we presented. For example, the actual MIPS data memory has a data
segment where the program data is, a heap for extra space and a stack to handle
subroutine calls. In our modeling we do not formally distinguish between these. Our
desiderate is to use the formal executable semantics of SSRISC for the design and
analysis of non-functional requirements (i.e. time, energy) of the embedded software
systems.
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